The political drivers of renewable energies policies by Cadoret, Isabelle & Padovano, Fabio
The political drivers of renewable energies policies
Isabelle Cadoret, Fabio Padovano
To cite this version:
Isabelle Cadoret, Fabio Padovano. The political drivers of renewable energies policies. Energy
Economics, Elsevier, 2016, <10.1016/j.eneco.2016.03.003>. <halshs-01290360>
HAL Id: halshs-01290360
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01290360
Submitted on 18 Mar 2016
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
THE POLITICAL DRIVERS OF RENEWABLE ENERGIES POLICIES1
Isabelle Cadoret
Centre Condorcet for Political Economy and 
CREM-CNRS, University of Rennes 1, 
Rennes, France;
Fabio Padovano2
Centre Condorcet for Political Economy and 
CREM-CNRS, University of Rennes 1, 
Rennes, France; and DPS, University Roma 
Tre, Italy
ABSTRACT 
This paper empirically analyzes how political factors affect the deployment of renewable 
energy (RE) sources and compares their explanatory power to that of other economic, energy 
and environmental drivers that have received greater attention in the literature so far. The 
sample encompasses the EU countries bound to attain the target of 20% share of gross final 
energy consumption by 2020. The panel data analysis shows that lobbying by the 
manufacturing industry negatively affects RE deployment, whereas standard measures of 
government quality show a positive effect; furthermore left wing parties promote the 
deployment of RE more than right wing ones.  
JEL classification codes: Q28, H54, H87, D72, D73, D78 
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THE POLITICAL DRIVERS OF RENEWABLE ENERGIES POLICIES 
1. Introduction 
This paper has two main goals. The first is to empirically analyze to what extent political 
factors explain the countries’ decisions to deploy renewable energy (RE). The deployment of 
RE is a good indicator of countries’ commitment in the promotion of environmental friendly 
energy policies and, as we shall see, one that has received little attention in the scientific 
literature. The second, closely connected one, is to compare the explanatory power of those
political determinants with that of other economic, energy and environmental drivers that 
have received greater attention in the literature so far, at least in the particular case of RE.  
The reasons for interest in this analysis are manifold. To begin with, the attention devoted 
to the political and institutional drivers fills an analytical lacuna in our understanding of RE 
deployment. This lacuna is all the more serious, since investing in RE sources is, first and 
foremost, a political decision. Governments actually finance the deployment of RE in 
response to multiple political factors. Among them, the pressure of lobbies that demand a
greater use of RE sources, like the environmentalists and the green energy industry; the 
pressure of lobbies instead contrary to such deployment, like the nuclear and the oil based 
industries; and, last but not least, governments invest in RE provided that it yields a positive 
rate of return in terms of expected votes.  
Furthermore, the deployment of REs is a ‘hot’ policy issue, as the COP21 conference held 
in 2015 shows. In the EU; the combined needs of reducing its energy dependency and 
protecting the quality of the environment have pushed the Commission to set a series of 
targets that member countries must reach by 2020 (Directive 2009/28/EC); among those, a 
share of REs in gross final energy consumption of at least 20%. The task is daunting, since 
considerable differences exist in RE gross final energy consumption among the member 
countries. Malta, for instance, consumes no RE at all, while in Sweden they represent 43% of 
total energy consumption3. Such large cross country differences among a group of rather 
homogeneous and closely integrated economies cast doubts on the validity of models that rely 
exclusively on economic and environmental determinants. Political factors must also play a 
role.
To compare the explanatory power of the politico-institutional factors with that of the 
better studied economic and environmental drivers, our empirical strategy adopts the 
                                                          
3As shown in Figure 1, section 3.1., in the rest of the EU27 countries the mean value of the RE sources 
in total energy consumption is 13.76% for the 2004-2011 time period, with a variance of 110.24.
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following road-map. First, as virtually all of the theoretical and empirical models that have 
studied the influence of political drivers on energy and environmental policy have focused on 
indicators different from the deployment of RE, we begin by illustrating the simple 
correlations between the countries’ RE shares and the main political explanatory variables
identified in the literature. In a second step we collapse the politico-institutional variables 
with the economic, energy and environmental ones into a single empirical model. This allows 
us to assess the relative explanatory power of the political determinants, but also to 
investigate whether they exert their influence on REs directly or indirectly, through the 
mediation of other conditioning phenomena. The influence of a leftist government, for 
instance, can be expected to be conditional on the cohesion of its parliamentary majority.  
The estimates yield several interesting results. First of all, political factors play a 
significant role in explaining countries’ decisions to deploy RE, even when the standard 
economic, energy and environmental phenomena are explicitly controlled for. The most 
relevant political drivers are the lobbying power of the manufacturing industry, which 
effectively retards the deployment of RE, and measures of governance quality, which instead 
show a positive effect. Left wing parties appear to promote the deployment of RE more than 
right wing ones. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main theoretical 
arguments relating political economy variables with energy policy decisions. Section 3 
presents the data and the basic correlations. Section 4 introduces the empirical model and 
discusses the main results of the estimates. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Literature review 
Both at the theoretical and at the empirical level, political economy analyses of energy 
and environmental policy decisions have mainly focused on two types of determinants: the 
quality of government, which also includes the institutional framework where energy and 
environmental policy decisions are implemented; and the ideology of the incumbent 
government. Here we will illustrate these two literature strands, to motivate the choice of the 
independent variables included in our empirical model, described in the next section. 
2.1. Quality of governance. The inverted Kutznets curve is the theoretical framework 
whereby the relationship between the economic performance, the quality of governance and 
the quality of the environment is usually studied. In poor countries people value material 
well-being more than environmental amenities; yet, once a country reaches a sufficiently high 
per capita income, citizens pay greater attention to the environment. Insofar as policies 
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respond to people’s preferences, we should observe that poor countries tend to sacrifice the 
environment at the expense of development, while rich countries do the opposite (Arrow et al.
1995).Everything hinges, however, on the extent to which policies (including environmental 
ones) reflect people’s preferences. Corruption, a standard measure of governance quality, 
reduces the responsiveness of policies to citizens’ preferences and should then raise the 
income level at which environmental protecting policies start to be adopted. Lopez and Mitra 
(2000) reach this conclusion simulating a model of the environmental consequences of 
government corruption and rent-seeking. In a similar vein, Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) 
study both theoretically and empirically the contrasting effects of corruption and political 
instability on the implementation of environmental policies. They predict that corruption 
reduces the “stringency” (i.e., the efficiency of implementation) of environmental regulations;
yet political instability should offset this effect, as it lowers the rate of return on corrupt
practices. They find support for this claim in a cross section analysis on 63 countries.  
Some studies in this literature strand associate corruption with lobbying activities. 
Fredriksson et al. (2004) for instance considers the combined effects of corruption and of 
industry size – a proxy for lobbying efficiency - on the outcomes of energy policy in the 
OECD countries. Their theoretical structure builds  on the menu auction model and generates 
quite many predictions disaggregated at the industry level, namely, that (i) greater 
corruptibility reduces the stringency of energy policy; (ii) higher costs of lobby coordination 
cause energy policy to become more stringent; (iii) when the effect of energy policy on wages 
is large (small), the influence of worker coordination costs on the stringency of energy policy 
is also large (small), whereas the effect on capital owners’ coordination costs is small (large). 
The empirical results, based on sectorial data from 12 OECD countries over the period 1982-
1996, are generally consistent with these theoretical predictions. A number of other empirical 
studies (Fredriksson, Vollebergh, 2009; Morse 2006; Welsh, 2004) broadly confirm these 
theoretical predictions using different samples, measures of governance quality and diffusion 
of lobbies as well as estimating techniques.  
2.2. Ideology. Government ideology is another political factor that potentially affects the 
environmental quality and the stringency of energy policies. Potrafke (2010) investigates the 
hypothesis (among others) that market oriented and right wing governments have been more 
active at deregulating product markets, among them, the market for energy. His empirical 
estimates show that right wing governments do in fact promote deregulation of the energy 
market. Also the concentration of the government majority seems to positively affect market
deregulation, while the institutional constraints, captured by the comprehensive Henisz index, 
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appear not to play a major role. Chang and Berdiev (2011) as well as Biressieloglu and 
Karaibrahimoglu (2012) focus on the effects of government ideology and of other political 
factors on the energy market alone. Their results confirm that left wing governments favor 
regulation in the energy sector, with the fragmentation of government again playing a partly 
offsetting role. More stringent institutional constraints seem to favor the deregulation of the 
sector. On the other hand, market-oriented, right wing governments endorse energy 
deregulation, although the link between environmental policy and government ideology in 
this case appears less evident than for left wing governments. Both studies look at 
government ideology only, disregarding other political dimensions that may have an impact 
on energy policy decisions. That is likely to prove a serious neglect, as Neumayer (2003), for 
instance, makes the interesting point that left wing governments may find themselves in an 
ambivalent position vis à vis the protection of the environment. That because policy decisions 
aimed at protecting the environment can be costly in terms of employment levels. 
Employment concerns may be particularly influential in policy decisions in countries that 
adopt corporatist governance methods. In such a case a conflict arises in the political 
objectives of left wing parties when they run the government. Neumayer’s (2003) empirical 
analysis indeed confirms such ambivalence. 
To sum up, all these studies concur in pointing out that various indicators of the quality of 
governance, of the pervasiveness of interest groups, of the type of institutional system in 
place, as well as of the ideology of governments are all potentially relevant factors in shaping 
environmental and energy policies – even though none of these studies specifically refers to 
RE. At the same time, all these studies share three drawbacks. First, they insist on a single 
type of political economy determinants, i.e., either the quality of governance or political 
ideology. Second, none of them compares the relative importance of the political drivers of 
RE deployment with alternative types of conditioning factors, like economic, energy and 
environmental indicators. Third, although some of these studies exploit panel data, the large 
majority of them fails to explore the dynamic properties of the estimated relationships,
treating them to be either contemporaneous or equilibrium ones.4 We try to overcome these 
shortcomings by a) considering a more comprehensive set of political determinants; b) 
                                                          
4 The only possible exceptions are Marques et al. (2010) and Potrafke (2010). They first use a FEVD 
model to distinguish between time varying and time invariant covariates. As we shall see in the appendix, this 
estimator is subject to critiques. Potrafke (2010), instead adopts a least squares dummy variable estimator for 
dynamic panel data, where the dependent variable is lagged and economic variables enter as growth rates. He 
limits the analysis to a small set of covariates, however, and does not consider the significance of more than one 
lag. 
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comparing the explanatory power of the political drivers with that of the standard economic, 
energy and environmental factors; c) providing a thorough examination of the dynamic 
properties of the estimated relationships, checking for their stochastic properties, the 
significance of different lag structures, trends and time dummies.  
3. Data, correlations and model specification 
3.1. The dataset. We perform our empirical analysis on data about the share of RE in gross 
energy consumption in a sample of 26 EU countries over the period 2004-2011. The time 
series of our panel begins in 2004 because Eurostat, our data source for the dependent 
variable, started to collect coherent data only then; it ends in 2011, the last year for which 
DPI, the Database of Political Institutions, provides data about political and institutional 
variables. Within the countries that constitute the cross section dimension of the panel there 
are 21 OECD countries, namely the EU15 countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK) plus the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. We also consider five non OECD countries that are closely integrated with the 
OECD group, namely Bulgaria, Cyprus, Romania, Latvia and Lithuania. The sample excludes 
Malta because the share of RE in gross energy consumption is nihil over the entire period.  
3.2. The variables. We select the share of RE in gross final energy consumption as the 
endogenous variable because it is the closest proxy to the indicator actually referred to in 
Directive 2009/28/EC. As such, the regressand measures the stringency of the environmental 
policies of each country5.
[Figure 1 about here] 
In line with the literature we categorize  the explanatory variables in three vectors: 1) the 
political economy variables W, the focus of our analysis; 2) the economic variables X; 3) the 
energy and environmental variables Z. Among the political economy variables W we consider 
the quality of governance, the influence of lobbies, government ideology, as well as the 
institutional framework where RE deployment decisions are taken. The theoretical literature 
                                                          
5 This is apparently be the same variable considered by Biressieloglu and Karaibrahimoglu (2012). We, 
however, use only the official Eurostat statistics, the very same that is in the Directive 2009/28/EC. Biressieloglu 
and Karaibrahimoglu (2012, p. 32) instead merge these data with national statistics to extend time series. Once 
we tried the same procedure, we noticed ‘jumps’ in the series that reduce the reliability of the estimates. So we 
decided to stick to the data that politicians actually observe, i.e., the official Eurostat ones. Furthermore, 
Biressieloglu and Karaibrahimoglu (2012) examine only government ideology among the political factors, and 
have a much smaller set of economic, environmental and energy controls. 
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suggests the following correlations: a higher quality of governance, proxied by lower levels of 
corruption, should result in more stringent energy and environmental policies, hence in a 
higher share of RE. To check the robustness of the results, we use two alternative indicators 
of governance quality: the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which measures the perceived 
levels of public sector corruption, from Transparency International. The scale is [0, 10], where 
higher scores mean lower corruption in the broadest possible sense; and the Control of 
Corruption Index from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WBGI_CCI), whose 
scale is [-2.5, 2.5], normally distributed, with a zero mean and a standard deviation of one. 
The CCI measures corruption perceptions in a narrower sense, since in this case corruption is 
defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. Higher values again indicate a better 
control of corrupt practices6. Partly because our sample has a limited time dimension, partly 
because the EU countries feature fairly stable governance systems, the variances within of 
these indicators are quite limited. We have therefore taken the average values of both the CPI 
and the WBGI_CCI over time for each country and have considered these measures as 
country specific characteristics. This also avoids problems of comparison over time that may 
plague the CPI index.  
As for government ideology, left wing governments should prefer more market regulation, 
also in the domain of environmental policy (Chang and Berdiev, 2011; Biressieloglu and 
Karaibrahimoglu, 2012); yet, according to Neumayer (2003), tougher environmental controls 
might negatively affect employment levels, thus creating a conflict among two typical 
concerns of left wing parties. The evaluation of the overall sign of the correlation is left to the 
empirical analysis. Our measure of ideology comes from the DPI and consists of a dummy,
LEFT, which discriminates between governments supported by a left wing majority, and 
those that express a right wing or a center ideology7. The literature points out that the 
influence of political ideology on environmental policy decisions can be conditioned by the 
cohesion of the government majority and by the institutional framework in which the 
                                                          
6We have also checked another indicator, The ICRG index of the quality of government, which assesses 
the diffusion of corruption within the political system. The scale is [0, 1], where higher values also indicate a 
better quality of governance. As the results were basically in line with those obtained with the other two 
indicators, we have omitted them from the main text.
7 The DPI classifies governments as “right wing” when they are supported by parties defined as 
conservative, Christian democratic, or right wing; as “left wing” when they are supported by parties defined as 
communist, socialist, social democratic, or left wing; and as center, when the supporting parties advocate
strengthening private enterprise in a social-liberal context. As there are very few center governments in our 
sample, we adopt a more parsimonious specification of the ideology variable and join the center and right wing 
governments into a single group. The results do not change qualitatively. Incidentally, green and 
environmentalist parties are considered as left wing by the DPI.
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government operates. First, more cohese left wing governments are better able to adopt (and 
stick to) long run policy decisions, such as RE deployment. Incidentally, more cohese 
governments may also be more resilient to the influence of lobbies. To capture these effects 
we have interacted the government ideology dummy with the concentration of the governing 
coalition, measured by the standard Herfindhal index, HERF, again from DPI. The index 
ranges between 0 and 1, where 1 denotes single party governments, i.e., the highest possible 
concentration of the ruling coalition. Second, we have also verified whether the type of 
government system (parliamentarian vs. presidential) might influence RE deployment, 
through the different decision making costs that the two institutional frameworks engender. 
As the effects of the institutional framework on RE deployment have never been explored, no 
theoretical prior exists about this point. Standard political economy theory, however, 
maintains that presidential systems, where the government is directly elected in a national 
constituency, should be better able to implement policies of national scope (Persson and 
Tabellini, 2001), such as the deployment of RE. To check whether it is the case, we introduce 
a dummy PARLIAMENTARY, also from DPI. Finally, we examine also the effects of 
lobbying activities on RE end use. So far, the empirical literature has considered only the 
lobbying activities of capital owners in the energy industry, usually proxied by the value 
added of the energy industry as a percentage of GDP (Fredriksson and Vollebergh, 2009; 
Marques et al., 2010; Marques and Fuinhas, 2011). Higher ratios were associated with higher 
penetration by the energy industry lobby, which should decrease the stringency of 
environmental and energy policies. Yet theory (Fredriksson et al., 2004) has argued that the 
effects of lobbying on environmental policy decisions is a far more complex phenomenon, 
since also the relative size of the energy industry and the relative lobbying efficiency of 
workers and capital owners should play a role. No data are available for these theoretical 
variables, yet we try to adhere as much as possible to the logic of the model by examining the 
value added of the manufactory sector (VA_MAN), normalized by total GDP. This variable 
proxies the lobbying strength of the industrial sector most prone to resisting the deployment 
of RE because of the higher costs that RE engender8.
                                                          
8In order to obtain a broader picture of the influence of lobbies, we have also considered the value 
added of the total industry (VA_IND) and of the agricultural sectors (VA_AGR), normalized by total GDP, but 
they never turned out statistically significant. The same applies when we have introduced the value added of the 
energy industry and a dummy that marks the presence of state owned enterprises in the energy sector. 
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Vector X comprises the standard economic variables considered in the literature, namely, 
the level of GDP per capita (GDP) and its growth rate (GDP_GROWTH), from PWT 8.19. 
The expected sign on this covariate is a typical Slutsky equation issue: through an income 
effect, a higher per capita GDP should stimulate energy consumption, including that produced 
through RE. On the other hand, peaks of demand that are endemic to energy consumption 
may trigger the substitution of RE-based energy, which is still erratic and difficult to stock, 
with other sources (Marques et al., 2010). Which of the two effects dominates determines the 
sign of the coefficient on per capita GDP. Positive past growth rates of GDP, on the other 
hand, indicate that more resources have been generated which could be invested in RE; hence 
the expected sign on lagged GDP_GROWTH is positive.  
Finally, vector Z captures the effects of the energy and the environmental variables that 
have been usually considered in the literature. The first argument of Z is the real price of 
energy end use (PRICE) from IEA statistics. As for GDP per capita, we test different lags for 
this variable. In a contemporaneous setting, a price increase should depress energy demand, 
including RE. With time, however, higher energy prices should promote policy choices aimed 
at reducing energy intensity and dependency; moreover, higher prices may make RE more 
economically viable, thereby encouraging investments in RE. We also consider the energy 
dependency ratio (DEP_ENERGY) and a measure of the environmental degradation, namely 
(CO2_ELEC). Energy dependency indicates to what extent a country relies upon imports to 
meet its energy requirements10. As for environmental degradation, in line with Marques et al. 
(2010) and Marques and Fuinhas (2011), we use CO2 emissions from electricity and heat 
production (as a percentage of total final combustion) from the World Bank. Both energy 
dependency and CO2 emissions should push the EU countries to promote the development of 
RE. Finally, we consider some (time invariant) environmental policy controls. The first 
captures the commitment of each EU country to the target share of RE in gross final energy 
consumption for 2020, set by the directive 2009/28/EC. This variable, called TARGET, is the 
share of RE in gross final energy consumption assigned to the country by the Commission. Its 
expected sign is positive. The second control identifies to the policy approach that each EU 
country has adopted to achieve its target. To this end we have introduced the covariate 
                                                          
9 Specifically, GDP per capita is expressed in PPP converted (Chain Series) values, at 2005 constant 
prices.
10 Following Eurostat, this indicator is calculated as the net imports of energy divided by the sum of 
gross inland energy consumption plus bunkers.
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environmental taxes (ENV_TAX), which refers to the percentage of total revenues 
represented by environmental taxes, according to the classification by Eurostat. To the extent 
that such revenues are actually earmarked for environmental purposes, such as the 
deployment of RE, the expected sign is positive.11
3.3. Simple correlations and descriptive statistics. The descriptive statistics of the dataset 
are presented in Table 1, while their standard errors are reported in Table 2. Several points are 
noteworthy, beginning with the large differences that exist among the countries in the share of 
RE in gross final energy consumption, illustrated in Figure 1.  
[Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
Since this is the first study to consider the influence of political drivers on RE 
deployment, we make a first check of the applicability of political models developed for other 
of energy and environmental policies to the case of RE by illustrating a set of simple 
correlations. Beginning with the influence of lobbying, the correlation between RE and the 
value added of the manufacturing sector, reported in Figure 2, is far from being clear cut12. 
Nor for the quality of governance, in Figure 3 proxied by Transparency International’s 
perceived corruption, an evident correlation emerges. Finally, Table 3 looks at the 
relationship between government ideology and RE deployment. When we consider the overall 
share of RE in gross energy consumption, we see that countries with a right wing government 
slightly edge over those with a left wing one. This result changes, however, when we 
disaggregate the sample between countries that belong to the EU15 group and those that do 
not (mainly the former eastern European ones). In the EU15 group left wing governments 
appear more engaged in the deployment of RE, as the literature predicts (Biressieloglu and 
Karaibrahimoglu, 2012); Spain and Portugal are two cases in point. In the non EU15 
countries, however, right wing governments appear to promote RE much more than left wing 
ones, with Estonia and the Czech Republic as prominent examples. Overall, correlations and 
descriptive statistics can go only so far in analyzing such a complex phenomenon as the 
                                                          
11 We have also considered two alternative instruments, to verify whether each country relies more on a 
market-based approach to pursue environmental goals, like tradable green certificates TGC, or on a more 
interventionist approach, that uses feed-in tariffs FIT as the principal instruments (Nielsen and Jeppesen, 2003; 
Fouquet and Johanson, 2008; Schallenberg-Rodrigueza and Haasb, 2012). The covariate that discriminates 
between the two approaches, however, has never turned out significant, when considered alongside 
environmental taxes. 
12The correlation with the value added of total industry and of the agricultural sector yield quite similar 
results.
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determinants of RE deployment; a more comprehensive model, which includes all the 
possible conditioning factors together, is needed. 
[Figures 1-3 and table 3 about here]
3.4. Model specification and estimation procedures. Equation (1) expresses our model 
regression. To allow the interpretation of the estimated coefficients (when possible) as 
elasticities, we express the dependent variable in natural logarithms, (logRE). All arguments 
of vectors X, Z and W are also expressed in logs, with the exception of the variables in shares 
and growth rates. The equation is estimated with country specific effects ߙ௜
݈݋ܴ݃ܧ௜௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߜݐ ൅ ߚࢄ௜௧ ൅ ߛଵࢆ௜௧ ൅ ߛଶࢃ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧     (1) 
The model specification and the choice of the estimating technique depend on two issues of 
dynamics. The first issue is the stationarity – or not - of the dependent variable. To verify this 
we have performed a series of Levin-Lin-Chu panel unit-root tests on all the time varying 
continuous variables considered in equation (1). Table 4 reports the results. In all cases, the 
tests allow us to reject the null that the panels contain a unit root against the alternative 
hypothesis that they are trend stationary. This result was expected because of the relatively 
short time dimension of the panel. We therefore insert a trend t in the specification of the 
model, like in Fredriksson and Vollebergh (2009)13. The second issue hinges on the 
heterogeneous dynamics of the estimated relationships. Some economic variables, like the 
price of energy, may have both short term effects - on the consumption of RE - and long term 
ones - on investments in RE deployment. Other time variant variables, instead, like the 
proxies for governance quality and some institutional factors, should produce only delayed 
effects, either directly or through the energy and the environmental policies adopted. To 
disentangle the short from the long run effects, we introduce the variables referring to 
economic activity and to energy prices both in simultaneous values and with lags, while the 
other time variant variables are all specified with lags. Furthermore, we adopt the two step 
estimating technique of Greene (2011) by applying first a LSDV estimator that excludes the 
time invariant variables, and then by regressing the vector of the fixed effects on the time 
invariant/rarely changing variables via an OLS method with Eicker-White robust covariance 
matrix. Finally, the variable TARGET poses concerns of potential endogeneity, at least for 
two reasons: first, it is highly correlated with the dependent variable, the share of RE in gross 
final energy consumption (coefficient of correlation r=0.95); second, it is conceivable that the 
EU commission fixed a target for each country on the basis of the characteristics of its energy 
                                                          
13To verify the robustness of the result we have estimates the same model using year dummies too, but 
they never proved statistically significant. 
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sector. We have treated this potential problem specifically, by re estimating equation 1 with 
the Hausman-Taylor estimator, which is explicitly a GLS-IV estimator that generates 
instruments for the covariates. The results, available upon request, do not change 
qualitatively, suggesting that endogeneity should not be an issue. Other independent variables, 
on the other hand, are not likely suspects of endogeneity, either because they enter with lags, 
or because, like the indicators of corruption, it is really difficult to imagine how a larger share 
of RE in gross final energy consumption could affect the country’s perceived corruption.
4. Estimation results  
The results of the estimates of equation (1) are presented in Tables5a-5b. Table 5a
illustrates the results of stage one, which applies a LSDV estimator to the “time variant” 
variables; table 5b reports the results of the OLS regression of the fixed effects vector on the 
time invariant/rarely changing variables based on the best fitting estimates. The second stage 
models of the LSDV estimates use the most parsimonious first stage specification, i.e., the 
one including just the variables and lags found to be statistically significant. All specifications 
include country fixed effects.  
4.1. The role of economic factors. The consideration of the variables related to GDP 
yields the first innovative results. The literature survey indicates that there is no conclusive 
empirical evidence of an impact of economic variables on the deployment of RE in electricity 
production; this is a rather odd result, as it is quite difficult to conceive that variations in 
economic activity do not have any impact on RE. We, however, find a pattern of statistically
significant, albeit partially contrasting effects of economic variables on the share of RE in 
gross consumption, a negative one from the per capita GDP and its contemporaneous growth, 
while a positive one on lagged GDP growth. The lack of statistical evidence in the previous 
studies might thus be explained by a misspecification of the complex dynamics of the 
relationship between RE deployment and the variables that meter the state of the economy. To 
uncover this dynamics we have followed the statistical significance tests, which indicated to 
include the GDP per capita with one lag and its rate of growth in contemporaneous values and 
with one lag. The results thus obtained suggest that when economic activity increases, the 
greater energy consumption that the increased production requires is not immediately met by 
RE, but rather by other, more elastic energy sources that can be more easily stocked and/or 
imported, like fossil based ones. Hence the ratio of RE consumption on gross energy 
consumption decreases. On the other hand, this greater energy demand stimulates greater 
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investment in RE production, which explains why the lagged growth rate of GDP per capita 
shows instead a significant and positive effect on the share of RE. This effect is however 
quantitatively similar to the negative one found on contemporaneous growth, to the point that 
the two apparently cancel out. A possible explanation for the neutrality of economic growth 
on RE deployment might be that the TARGET variable actually captures the countries’ 
investment in RE (Table 5b). This would also imply that, without the stimulus dictated by the 
EU, market forces would not be sufficient – and would not find economically viable - to 
increase the share of RE in gross energy consumption – a classical example of market failure. 
Furthermore, the linear trend, introduced as in Fredriksson and Vollebergh (2009) to proxy 
the effects of technological progress on RE consumption, has always the expected positive 
coefficient and it is statistically significant in all specifications, with values around 0.06. The 
presence of the variable TARGET among the rarely changing ones excludes the possibility 
that the linear trend captures the country’s progressive approaching to the target set by the EU 
Commission. 
This rather complex but stable pattern of results demonstrates the importance of 
investigating the dynamics of the relationship between economic state variables and RE 
deployment.  
4.2. The impact of energetic and environmental factors. Among the energy and 
environmental factors Z we focus first on energy prices. We consider the energy end-use 
price, which is linked to the prices of fossil-based fuels and provides the basis for the price for 
energy consumers. We verify both the contemporaneous effects of energy prices on RE 
energy consumption and, with delays linked to investment, on energy production as well. For 
instance, the use of RE to product electricity becomes more competitive when the prices of 
fossil-based fuels are higher; an increase of energy prices should then favor the substitution 
from fossil-based fuels towards RE with some delay.  
The results of the estimates show that, on the one hand, energy prices have a significant 
and positive effect on the share of RE in gross consumption with a two period delay. The 
price elasticity approximates 0.9, in all specifications. An increase of the energy prices makes 
RE more economically viable and promotes its deployment with a delay of two years. As for 
the other energy and environmental factors considered, four more results are worth noting. 
First, a 1% increase of the energy dependency ratio will induce a 0.6% simultaneous increase 
of the share of RE, in all specifications. This result is especially interesting in light of the EU 
energy policy aimed at reducing the energy dependency ratio of the member countries, at 
increasing their energy efficiency and at reducing the imports of fossil-based fuels. Second, 
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environmental degradation too triggers a substitution of standard energy sources by RE ones,
as the (expected) positive coefficient on the third lag of the CO2_ELEC variable confirms. 
Environmental taxes are neutral with respect to the deployment of RE, as the lack of statistical 
significance of the estimated coefficient on ENV_TAX shows. A political economy 
explanation is that their revenues do not finance this particular form of environmental 
protection, but they are likely used for general budget purposes. Finally, and not surprisingly, 
countries with a higher target for RE deployment in 2020 are also characterized by a higher 
share of RE than countries with lower targets (table 5b).  
[Tables 5a and5b about here] 
4.3. Political economy variables. Finally, vector W features the political economy 
covariates, the principal interest of our analysis. Starting from the lobbying variables, the 
pressure from the manufactural sector provides a noticeable resistance to the deployment of 
RE, with a 3 years delay14. Being quite energy dependent, both within the industrial sector 
and the economy at large, manufacturers tend to resist the increase of energy costs that RE 
engender. Another possible interpretation is that the manufactural sector is opposed to 
environmental regulations in general, of which RE deployment is an important part. 
Coming to the ideology of the government majority, we have first investigated whether 
EU15 countries and non EU 15 ones behave differently in the deployment of RE when they 
are governed by a left wing majority. The descriptive statistics of table 3 suggested that this 
appeared to be the case, conditional on the imposition of the ceteris paribus condition that 
only the regression analysis allows. Model 1 suggests that, once this condition is considered, 
left wing governments of both EU15 and non EU 15 countries promote the deployment of RE 
more than their right wing counterparts. This effect appears with a three year delay – a fairly 
standard policy implementation lag. The differences among these two groups of countries are 
however negligible: the Fisher test of equality of the coefficients on the LEFT˟EU15 and the 
LEFT˟non EU15 regressors rejected the null that they are statistically significantly different. 
In model 2 we have therefore joined the two interactive variables into a single dummy LEFT, 
which confirms that, when left wing governments are in the government, the share of RE in 
gross final energy consumption is 6% higher than when the government is supported by a 
right wing majority, all other things being equal. The positive coefficient on the LEFT 
                                                          
14 We have also tried to consider only the energy industry, but neither the KLEMS database, nor OECD 
data provide a sufficient coverage for our sample. Furthermore, we have considered also the share of value added 
of the agricultural sector and of the overall industrial sector, without ever finding significant effects. The results 
with the alternative lobbying indicators are available upon request.
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covariate indicates that the contrasting concerns between environmental protection and 
maximization of employment that Neumayer (2003, 2004) refers to is either not an issue in 
our sample or it has been solved in favor of RE deployment. Finally, in model 3 we have 
interacted the dummy LEFT with a the Herfindhal metrics of the concentration of the 
government majority, to verify whether this acts as conditioning phenomena, but this never 
appears to be the case.  
The governance quality indicator - the Corruption Perception Index from Transparency 
International– is among the covariates that are time invariant or are characterized by low time 
variability. The estimates overall confirm the positive effect of the quality of governance on 
the deployment of RE, as it shows a significant and positive correlation with the dependent 
variable. Model (1) shows that, with respect to such result, there is no difference between 
EU15 countries and the rest of the sample. To check for robustness we have also re-estimated 
equation (1) using the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index (Table 5c, model 4); the 
results are quite similar. Finally, there is no evidence that either parliamentary or presidential 
regimes make any difference in the way decisions about RE deployment are taken. The 
dummy PARLIAMENTARY is never statistically significant, neither alone nor when 
interacted with LEFT governments.  
To verify the relative impact (and explanatory power) of the main covariates considered 
on RE, we have estimated the effect of 1% changes (or of unitary changes for the non-
continuous variables) on the dependent variable for all the countries included in the sample. 
The first column to the right of the list of the countries reports the share of RE in gross final 
energy consumption for each country in the year 2013. The following columns report what 
this value would have been in the case where each of the variables had a 1% increase; or if it 
had changed value for the dummy LEFT; or it had increased by a unit in the score of the CPI 
variable (i.e., a 1 point improvement in the quality of governance). The estimated values show 
that the political variables, especially the quality of governance, exert the quantitatively 
largest impact on gross final consumption of RE. In most countries in the sample, a 1 unit 
increase in the score of the quality of governance in the years of the sample would have 
resulted in a share of RE in gross final consumption roughly 10% larger. The same effect 
would have been obtained by a 10% rise in the country’s energy dependency, or by a 8% 
growth of the price of energy. All in all, political factors are an important driver of RE 
deployment. 
[Table 6 about here] 
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5. Conclusion 
The analysis presented in this paper highlights the role played by political factors in the 
deployment of RE, in the sample of the EU countries engaged to reach a target of 20% share 
of gross final energy consumption by 2020. Among the most clear-cut results, we find that the 
manufactural industry lobbying effectively retards the deployment of RE, whereas standard 
measures of governance quality show a positive effect. Finally, left wing parties promote the 
deployment of RE more than right wing ones, regardless of the level of concentration of the 
governing majority and the institutional framework where decisions about RE deployment are 
taken. These results are robust to changes in the model specification and to controlling for the 
standard economic, energy and environmental covariates that have been usually considered in 
the literature. 
Yet, our analysis also clarifies a series of unsettled issues in the literature on the drivers of 
environmental and energy policy choices. The panel data analysis shows that, while per capita 
income has a negative impact on RE deployment, economic growth seems to be neutral. This 
is possibly due to the fact that the countries’ engagement to reach the EU target of RE sources 
in energy consumption is the main stimulus to investing in RE deployment; market forces 
would not be sufficient. On the other hand, the lack of any significant correlation between 
environmental tax revenues and RE deployment suggests that governments use such revenues 
for general purposes rather than for the protection of the environment. All in all, the forces 
that affect the spread of RE in energy consumption appear to follow complex processes, that 
deserve further research effort. 
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Table 1. Variable sources and descriptive statistics 
Series Source Mea
n
Std 
Error
Min. Max. N.
ob
s.
logRE Eurostat 2,29 0,85 -
0,10
3,88 20
8
logGDP Penn World Table 10,0
8
0,43 9,08 11,0
4
20
8
GDP_GROWT
H
Penn World Table 1,78 4,39 -
17,3
7
11,7
5
20
8
logPRICE IEA Statistics 4,66 0,08 4,46 4,88 20
8
ENV_TAX Eurostat 7,34 1,51 4,40 12,2
1
20
8
DEP_ENERGY Eurostat 54,7
1
28,60 -
49,8
0
102,
50
20
8
VA_MAN World Bank - WDI database 16,7
2
5,16 5,44 25,9
6
20
8
TARGET DIRECTIVE 2009/28/CE 21,8
5
9,69 11,0
0
49,0
0
20
8
CORRUPT Transparency International 6,43 1,85 3,45 9,40 20
8
WBGI_CCI World Bank  - WGI Database 1,14 0,83 -
0,36
2,45 20
8
LEFT World Bank - Database of Political 
Instittions 
0,29 0,45 0,00 1,00 20
8
HERF World Bank - Database of Political 
Institutions 
0,61 0,24 0,18 1,00 20
8
PARLIAMENT
ARY
World Bank - Database of Political 
Institutions
0,84 0,36 0,00 1,00 20
8
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Table 2. Standard errors 
Series Overall Between Within
logRE 0,85 0,84 0,22
logGDP 0,43 0,43 0,05
GDP_GROWTH 4,39 1,58 4,11
logPRICE 0,08 0,03 0,08
ENV_TAX 1,51 1,41 0,61
DEPENERGIE 28,60 28,61 5,23
VA_MAN 5,16 5,11 1,18
TARGET 9,69 - -
CORRUPT 1,85 - -
WBGI_CCI 0,83 - -
LEFT 0,45 0,31 0,33
HERF 0,24 0,24 0,084
PARLIAMENTARY 0,36 - -
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Figure 1.  Share of RE in gross energy consumption (%) mean values 2004-2011 
AUT : Austria, BEL : Belgium, BGR : Bulgaria, CYP : Cyprus, CZE : Czech Republic, DNK : Denmark, EST : Estonia, FIN : Finland, 
FRA : France, DEU : Germany, GRC : Greece, HUN : Hungary, IRL : Ireland, ITA : Italy, LVA : Latvia, LTU : Lithuania, LUX :
Luxembourg, NLD : Netherlands, POL : Poland, PRT : Portugal, ROU : Romania, SVK : Slovakia, SVN : Slovenia, ESP : Spain, SWE :
Sweden, GBR : United Kingdom 
Source : Eurostat 
Figure 2. Lobbying influence 
 
AUT : Austria, BEL : Belgium, BGR : Bulgaria, CYP : Cyprus, CZE : Czech Republic, DNK : Denmark, EST : Estonia, FIN : Finland, 
FRA : France, DEU : Germany, GRC : Greece, HUN : Hungary, IRL : Ireland, ITA : Italy, LVA : Latvia, LTU : Lithuania, LUX :
Luxembourg, NLD : Netherlands, POL : Poland, PRT : Portugal, ROU : Romania, SVK : Slovakia, SVN : Slovenia, ESP : Spain, SWE :
Sweden, GBR : United Kingdom 
Source : Eurostat and World Bank (WDI database) 
 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
SW
E 
LV
A 
FI
N
 
AU
T 
PR
T 
ES
T 
RO
U
 
DN
K 
LT
U
 
SV
N
 
BG
R 
ES
P 
FR
A 
DE
U
 
GR
C 
PO
L 
IT
A 
SV
K 
CZ
E 
HU
N
 
CY
P 
IR
L 
BE
L 
N
LD
 
GB
R 
LU
X 
mean = 13.76 
variance = 110.24 
AUT
BEL
BGR
CYP
CZE
DNK EST
FIN
FRA DEU
GRC
HUN
IRL
ITA
LVA
LTU
LUX NLD
POL
PRT
ROU
SVK
SVN
ESP
SWE
GBR0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 
Sh
ar
e 
of
 re
ne
w
ab
le
 e
ne
rg
y 
in
 g
ro
ss
 e
ne
rg
y 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
(%
) 
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Figure 3. Quality of governance 
 
AUT : Austria, BEL : Belgium, BGR : Bulgaria, CYP : Cyprus, CZE : Czech Republic, DNK : Denmark, EST : Estonia, FIN : Finland, 
FRA : France, DEU : Germany, GRC : Greece, HUN : Hungary, IRL : Ireland, ITA : Italy, LVA : Latvia, LTU : Lithuania, LUX :
Luxembourg, NLD : Netherlands, POL : Poland, PRT : Portugal, ROU : Romania, SVK : Slovakia, SVN : Slovenia, ESP : Spain, SWE :
Sweden, GBR : United Kingdom 
Source : Eurostat and Transparency Agency 
 
 
Table 3. RE and government ideology 
All countries EU 15 countries Non EU 15 countries
Left = 0 14.1 12.82 15.7
Left = 1 13.0 15.8 9.0
 
Table 4. Test of stationary: Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test (AIC Criteria) 
Variable Statistic p_value
log RE (dependent variable) -8.55 0.000
log GDP -5.01 0.000
log PRICE -13.17 0.000
ENV_TAX -8.73 0.000
log DEP_ENERGY -13.71 0.000
VA_MAN -4.82 0.000
CO2 _Elec -9.17 0.000
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Table 5a: Estimates of Equation (1) Stage 1 Greene  
(1) (2) (3)
Ec
on
om
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
, 
ve
ct
or
 X
logGDPt-1 -0.886*** -0.903*** -0.939***
(-4.70) (-4.85) (-4.92)
GDP GROWTHt -0.00976*** -0.100*** -0.0102***
(-4.62) (-5.12) (-5.23)
GDP GROWTH t-1 0.00829** 0.00772** 0.00802
(3.03) (3.03) (3.12)
TREND 0.0625*** 0.0620** 0.0629**
(6.13) (6.12) (6.09)
logPRICE t-2 0.882*** 0.865*** 0.873***
(3.77) (3.79) (3.83)
En
er
gy
 a
nd
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l 
va
ria
bl
es
, 
ve
ct
or
 Z
DEP_ENERGYt 0.00609*** 0.00601*** 0.00599***
(3.89) (3.79) (3.77)
CO2_ELEC t-3 0.0121+ 0.121*** 0.122***
(1.84) (1.88) (1.90)
ENV_TAXt 0.0106
(0.70)
Po
lit
ic
al
 e
co
no
m
y 
va
ria
bl
es
, v
ec
to
r W
VA_MAN t-3 -0.00613* -0.00676* -0.00660**
(-2.51) (-2.89) (-2.83)
LEFTt-3*EU15 0.0650*
(2.35)
LEFTt-3*NonEU15 0.0580+
(1.88)
LEFTt-3 0.0606** 0.107
(2.81) (1.57)
HERF*LEFTt-3 -0.0652
(-0.80)
Country effect Yes Yes Yes
Time effect No No No
N 208 208 208
Adj. R2 0.998 0.998 0.998
BIC 151.1 -161.1 -156.6
P-value F(1,171)a 0.864
P-value F(26,*)b 0.00 0.00 0.00
t statistics in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, robust std. error 
a Fisher test of equality of coefficients LEFTt-3*EU15 and LEFTt-3*NonEU15 
b Fisher test of individual fixed effects 
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Table 5b: Estimates of Equation (1) Stage 2 Greene  
Dependent variable: log of the share of RE in gross final energy consumption
(1) (2) (3)
Po
lit
ic
al
 e
co
no
m
y 
va
ria
bl
es
, 
ve
ct
or
 Z
EU15 countryt 0.0470
(0.25)
TARGETt 0.0750*** 0.0741*** 0.0750***
(9.34) (9.47) (9.71)
PARLIAMENTARYt 0.117 0.139
(0.55) (0.78)
CPIt 0.0672 0.0754+ 0.0817*
(1.44) (1.85) (2.17)
CONSTANT 4.193*** 4.154*** 4.225***
(16.01) (17.58) (21.22)
N 26 26 26
Adj. R2 0.842 0.850 0.852
BIC 28.54 25.10 22.53
t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 5c. Estimates of Equation (1) Stage 2 Greene. Robustness checks 
Dependent variable: log of the share of RE in gross final energy consumption
(4) (5)
Po
lit
ic
al
 e
co
no
m
y 
va
ria
bl
es
, 
ve
ct
or
 Z
TARGETt 0.0750*** 0.0761***
(9.71) (10.22)
CPIt 0.0817*
(2.17)
WBGI_CCIt 0.175+
(2.06)
CONSTANT 4.225*** 4.589***
(21.22) (30.97)
N 26 26
Adj. R2 0.852 0.846
BIC 22.72 23.60
t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 6. Quantitative impacts of changes in the explanatory variables on the share of RE in gross energy final 
consumption, disaggregated by country 
Variable RE 
in 
201
3
logGD
P
GDP 
GROWT
H
logPRIC
E
DEP_ENER
GY
CO
2
VA_MA
N
LEFT CPI
Δ considered + 1% + 1% + 1% + 1% +
1%
+ 1% Change in
dummy 
variable
+ 1 point
in [0-10] 
scale
Austria
32,
6 32,3 32,5 32,9 32,8 33,0 32,4 33,7 35,3
Belgium 7,9 7,8 7,9 8,0 7,9 8,0 7,8 9,0 8,5
Bulgaria 19 18,8 19,0 19,2 19,1 19,2 18,9 20,1 20,6
Cyprus 8,1 8,0 8,1 8,2 8,1 8,2 8,0 9,2 8,8
Czech 
Republic
12,
4 12,3 12,4 12,5 12,5 12,6 12,3 13,5 13,4
Denmark
27,
2 27,0 27,1 27,4 27,4 27,5 27,0 28,3 29,4
Estonia
25,
6 25,4 25,5 25,8 25,8 25,9 25,4 26,7 27,7
Finland
36,
8 36,5 36,7 37,1 37,0 37,2 36,6 37,9 39,8
France
14,
2 14,1 14,2 14,3 14,3 14,4 14,1 15,3 15,4
Germany
12,
4 12,3 12,4 12,5 12,5 12,6 12,3 13,5 13,4
Greece 15 14,9 15,0 15,1 15,1 15,2 14,9 16,1 16,2
Hungary 9,8 9,7 9,8 9,9 9,9 9,9 9,7 10,9 10,6
Ireland 7,8 7,7 7,8 7,9 7,8 7,9 7,7 8,9 8,4
Italy
16,
7 16,5 16,7 16,8 16,8 16,9 16,6 17,8 18,1
Latvia
37,
1 36,8 37,0 37,4 37,3 37,5 36,8 38,2 40,1
Lithuania 23 22,8 22,9 23,2 23,1 23,3 22,8 24,1 24,9
Luxembourg 3,6 3,6 3,6 3,6 3,6 3,6 3,6 4,7 3,9
Netherlands 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,6 4,5 5,6 4,9
Poland
11,
3 11,2 11,3 11,4 11,4 11,4 11,2 12,4 12,2
Portugal
25,
7 25,5 25,6 25,9 25,9 26,0 25,5 26,8 27,8
Romania
23,
9 23,7 23,8 24,1 24,0 24,2 23,7 25,0 25,9
Slovakia 9,8 9,7 9,8 9,9 9,9 9,9 9,7 10,9 10,6
Slovenia
21,
5 21,3 21,5 21,7 21,6 21,8 21,4 22,6 23,3
Spain
15,
4 15,3 15,4 15,5 15,5 15,6 15,3 16,5 16,7
Sweden
52,
1 51,6 52,0 52,6 52,4 52,7 51,7 53,2 56,4
United 
Kingdom 5,1 5,1 5,1 5,1 5,1 5,2 5,1 6,2 5,5
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HIGHLIGHTS 
x 1st empirical analysis of how political factors affect renewable energy deployment 
x Lobbying by the manufacturing industry negatively affect RE deployment 
x Better governance quality increase RE deployment  
x Left-wing parties promote deployment of RE more than right wing ones.  
x Political factors are a quantitatively important driver of RE deployment 
